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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the two largest current global emitters of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), it is imperative that the United States and China work 
together to support effective domestic energy and climate 
change programs and an effective international climate regime. 
As China’s domestic energy policy has transformed over the last 
several years to incorporate climate-friendly goals – increased 
energy effi ciency and a greater contribution of non-fossil fuels 
to its energy mix – this opportunity is already becoming a real-
ity, especially as the United States advances comprehensive 
climate policy.
This report discusses the successes and challenges to effec-
tive regulation in China, outlining the major advances made 
in implementing effective energy effi ciency programs in the 
past several years. These include targeted programs for both 
large and small enterprises, specifi c goals for government of-
fi cials, and the development of energy statistics infrastructure. 
It also addresses U.S. competitiveness concerns in relation to 
the introduction of U.S. cap-and-trade policies, and specifi c 
opportunities for enhanced climate change cooperation be-
tween the two countries. 
China’s Energy and Climate Policy
China’s energy and climate change policy is based on its own 
assessment of national interest as outlined both in its 2007 
National Climate Change Program and 2008 Climate Change 
White Paper. China’s climate policy meshes with concerns 
about energy security, pollution abatement and the cost of 
energy itself, as well as the impacts of climate change and 
China’s international reputation.
Section 1 of China, the United States and the Climate Change 
Challenge, outlines China’s National Climate Change Program, 
the key components of which are:
• Reducing energy intensity per unit GDP by 20 percent 
between 2006 and the end of 2010,
• Increasing non-fossil fuel-based and renewable energy to 
15 percent of the energy mix by 2020, and
• Increasing total forest cover in China to 20 percent by 
the end of 2010.
China’s approach is diverse and includes targets and quotas, 
industrial and equipment standards, energy taxes and fi nancial 
incentives and penalties. While China has gained some expe-
rience with carbon markets through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (an offset mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol), 
given China’s institutional strength, as demonstrated by other 
policies, the country will likely use a variety of tools to continue 
to implement its climate change policy. Although these policies 
may not provide the environmental certainty of a cap-and-trade 
system, they can drive emissions reductions and may be more 
suited to the current development of China’s fi nancial markets 
and enforcement infrastructure.
U.S.-China Competitiveness Concerns and Coopera-
tion Opportunities
This brief addresses the concern in the United States about 
potential transfer of carbon-intensive jobs to China. While a 
carbon cost will not be a major factor in most sectors in the 
United States, some sectors could be affected. However, this 
concern can be addressed through adjustments to the United 
States’ domestic allowance system under cap-and-trade legisla-
tion, by coordinated action under an international agreement, 
or by trade measures. Trade measures are unlikely to be an 
attractive option as they increase costs for downstream users, 
threaten export markets and potentially damage international 
negotiations.
Comprehensive U.S. climate legislation could spur further 
improvements in China’s climate change programs and policies. 
Creating incentives in the United States for clean technologies 
will help drive down the prices of these technologies, mak-
ing them much easier for China and other major emitters to 
adopt. The United States can also collaborate with China in 
areas ranging from research and development to enforcement 
infrastructure to help China move its own policies forward. 
Finally, U.S. legislation can encourage China to do more as it 
positions itself as a global leader. 
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This brief outlines a number of bilateral and multilateral 
venues for enhanced cooperation. In the bilateral sphere, the 
new U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance 
Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environ-
ment, signed at the fi rst meeting of the revamped Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington, D.C. in 
July 2009, provides a coherent framework for this coopera-
tion.1 The new MOU incorporates the Ten Year Energy and 
Environment Framework developed under the previous 
U.S. presidential administration, provides a framework for 
cooperative projects and creates a new coordinating com-
mittee for both countries’ energy and environment agencies. 
The challenge will be to follow through on coordination and 
delineate clear goals and timetables. Many of the structures 
set up under the previous U.S. administration, not just 
bilaterally, but also multi-laterally, such as the Asia Pacifi c 
Partnership (APP) for Clean Development and Climate and 
the Major Economies Forum (MEF) have real potential to 
bring together key players, but they need more sharply de-
fi ned goals and missions, and the United States will need to 
clarify funding. All of these programs can support domestic 
policies in each country as well as both countries’ efforts to 
reach a global agreement at Copenhagen in December.
INTRODUCTION
Congressional debate about climate action in the United States 
often elicits questions about China’s domestic and international 
climate commitments. China’s total annual greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions have now surpassed those of the United 
States,2  leaving U.S. policymakers to question the impact of 
passing legislation at home in the face of perceived reluctance 
to act in China. Congress has also debated the impact of cli-
mate policy on U.S. industry and competitiveness if it enacts 
domestic limits to emissions and China does not.
Together the United States and China account for almost 40 
percent of total global emissions. Thus, despite great differ-
ences in both historical and per capita emissions, actions by 
both countries are essential to stabilizing and reducing emis-
sions over the next 40 years. 
In fact, China is on a trajectory of change. China’s current 
climate policy, as outlined in its June 2007 China’s National 
Climate Change Program and then presented internationally 
in its October 2008 White Paper China’s Policies and Actions 
for Addressing Climate Change, is real and signifi cant. If suc-
cessful, it will substantially slow the growth in China’s energy 
use and GHG emissions. This will be achieved through changes 
in energy policy as well as through long-standing reforestation 
policy. 
Today, each Chinese citizen produces only one fi fth the GHG 
emissions of an average American consumer, and China still has 
many unmet energy needs (See Figure 1). Most Chinese have 
a much lower standard of living than the average American. 
Half the Chinese population has no access to winter heating, 
and most have limited access to motorized transportation.3 
Therefore, the challenge for China in the short term is to 
reduce the rate of growth of its GHG emissions as it strives to 
meet the growing energy demands of its people. In the mid- 
to long-term, China must take advantage of the policy and 
technological changes that increased wealth offer to further 
climate change mitigation.  
China and the United States face a common challenge related 
to their primary source of energy – coal. With development 
pressures strong and coal resources plentiful, the challenge 
for China to shift to non-fossil fuel energy sources is sig-
nifi cant. With international capacity and policy support and 
focused national policy, China can develop more effi ciently 
and add a greater variety of non-carbon sources. This would 
enable it to avoid the trajectory that has led to a high level of 
per capita emissions in the United States today. 
This brief outlines and discusses the actions and policies 
that China is taking to address climate change. (Section 1). 
The authors then explain why a cap-and-trade program may 
be a policy option for China in the future but may not be 
the fi rst climate policy it chooses to enact. In looking at the 
programs China can implement the authors address China’s 
current technical capacity and its program implementation 
strengths and weaknesses, including the ability to monitor 
and report its outcomes both domestically and within an 
international agreement. The paper then turns to competi-
tiveness concerns (Section 3) and outlines how the United 
States can move forward with its own climate program while 
ensuring climate policy does not adversely affect the trade 
competitiveness of domestic industry. Finally, the authors 
examine steps the United States can take to promote swifter 
progress in China (Section 4) and conclude with the specifi c 
mechanisms available for U.S.-China engagement on climate 
change (Section 5). 
SECTION ONE
What action is China taking on climate change? 
In the past fi ve years, Chinese leaders have embraced policies 
to reduce the rate of increase in China’s energy demand for 
a variety of reasons.4 China has recognized that reducing the 
amount of energy used per unit of GDP (the concept known as 
energy intensity) and broadening the range of energy sources to 
include more renewable and nuclear energy improves energy 
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security and local air quality. The Chinese government, along 
with its leading industrialists and scientists, also believes in 
a green economic future.5 They recognize that the world is 
adopting new energy sources and technologies, and they want 
to compete in this new energy market. The government has 
recognized that reductions in fossil fuel combustion can im-
prove China’s currently strained ecosystem services by reduc-
ing air and water pollution. While there have been signifi cant 
improvements in air pollution levels, particularly in the past 
three years, the size of the challenge is enormous with levels 
still well above U.S. national standards.6 Its long-standing 
reforestation efforts,7 originally designed to improve soil and 
water quality,8 also contribute to reducing China’s net carbon 
dioxide emissions.
Chinese leaders now speak openly about the signifi cant risks 
China faces from the physical impacts of climate change. These 
include the potential fl ooding of coastal cities, changes in rain-
fall patterns that may strain already scarce water resources, 
costly climate events such as typhoons, and temperature 
change that could impact millions of people.9 
China is also interested in protecting its global image by taking 
action.10 President Hu Jintao has listed climate change as one of 
the areas where China must engage with the world community 
as part of his “peaceful development” approach to international 
relations.11 China has previously responded to international 
public opinion in addressing global environmental protection. 
For example, when an international consensus on reducing 
ozone-depleting substances was reached, Beijing responded 
with policies and programs commended by the United Nations 
Environment Program.12 
Since nearly three quarters of China’s GHG emissions result 
from the combustion of fossil fuels for energy (see Figure 2), 
the new energy policies will have a profound impact on China’s 
contribution to global warming. While China has tradition-
ally avoided policies that explicitly target GHG emissions, its 
energy and forestry programs have provided the framework 
for its National Climate Change Program (See Box 1). In addi-
tion, the government has recently shown a growing willingness 
Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Energy Statistics Figure 1
Source: Data Sources: CIA Factbook, IEA CO2 Emissions Report, WRI CAIT, IEA World Energy Statistics, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/
vehiclesandfuels/facts/2007_fcvt_fotw474.html
Vehicles per 100 population
Residential electricity consumption (TWh)
GHG emissions per capita (t CO2e)
Cumulative CO2 combustion emissions 1850–2004 (Gt)
Current GHG emissions (Gt CO2e)
Population (millions)
2 80
292 1,359
5.8 25.0
89 325
7.5 7.4
1,330 304
China’s National Climate Change Action Program, published in June 
2007, provides for three major mitigation efforts that, in combination, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions:
• Reducing the energy intensity of GDP by 20 percent over the 
fi ve years 2006 through the end of 2010.
• Increasing alternative energy in the fuel mix to 15 percent by 
2020.
• Increasing forest cover to 20 percent of China’s land mass by the 
end of 2010.
The national program is more than a mitigation program.  It also con-
tains support for climate science and for preparedness and adaptation. 
China’s scientists have been active in the global effort to understand 
climate change and are increasingly involved in developing technical 
approaches to both mitigation and adaptation.
 China’s National Climate Change 
ProgramBox 1
China         U.S.
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Policy Goal #1: Reduce National Energy Intensity 
by 20 percent by 2011
Concerns about energy security and environmental protection 
inspired the Chinese government to put a clear and ambitious 
20 percent energy intensity reduction goal in the 11th Five Year 
Plan. The program covers a broad range of effi ciency measures 
in industry, buildings and transportation and has been gaining 
in effectiveness as the commission and related ministries have 
developed the regulations, targets and guidelines that push 
implementation at the local level and in specifi c industries. 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) has been charged with implementing the energy 
intensity goal.
The program has been operational for three years. In 2008, 
China reduced its national energy intensity by 4.59 percent, up 
from 4.04 percent in 2007,15 and 1.79 percent in 2006.16 China 
thus appears to be approximately on target to make the 20 
percent goal by the end of 2010. The fi gure for the fi rst half of 
2009 suggests continuing progress as China’s energy intensity 
improved by 3.35 percent.17
EU-27
Energy Consumption by SectorFigure 3
Source: IEA World Energy 
Balances 2009.
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to target greenhouse gases directly. On World Environment 
Day in June 2009, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao announced 
that China would include some form of GHG emissions goals 
in its 12th fi ve year plan.13 While there have been few details 
released on the structure of the goals, National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) offi cials have indicated that 
they will cover all major GHGs.14
In seeking to control the increase in energy consumption, the 
government has set two key policy targets: to reduce national 
energy intensity by 20 percent by the end of 2010 and to in-
crease renewable energy as part of the national energy mix to 
15 percent by 2020. Both of these goals, which contribute to 
controlling GHG emissions, are ambitious by global standards, 
especially for a developing country, and China has enacted 
special policies to put it on track to meet these goals. These 
policies include some of the same mechanisms used in the 
United States including energy effi ciency standards, building 
codes and renewable portfolio standards as well as unique 
policy tools such as performance targets, quotas, and taxes. 
International Comparison of GHG 
Emissions by Sector, 2005
Figure 2
Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0. (Wash-
ington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2009). Note: Industrial pro-
cesses refers to GHGs emitted by various industrial processes (chemi-
cal reactions). Industrial energy use is included in the energy fi gure.
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Improvements in industrial effi ciency have been the major 
contributors to these energy intensity improvements, but China 
has also implemented important policy changes for buildings 
and transportation, smaller but growing parts of the economy 
and of energy use. As shown in Figure 3 below, China’s energy 
mix is unusually tilted toward industrial uses, and thus im-
provements in the industrial sector have large overall impacts.
The Chinese government’s ability to enforce policies, laws and regula-
tions varies considerably, depending both on the complexity of the task 
and the political commitment to effective enforcement. In some areas, 
such as the tracking of infectious disease cases, there has been consid-
erable improvement in the past six years as the government absorbed 
the lessons of the 2003 SARS crisis. It implemented a new national 
disease detection and reporting system and greatly increased transpar-
ency. Cases of infectious disease such as human avian infl uenza are now 
reported rapidly to the world.1 In other areas, such as food safety, where 
effective enforcement requires monitoring of a complex and dispersed 
system of small producers, the Chinese government clearly has much 
work to do.2 Energy and environment is an area in which there has 
been signifi cant change over the past fi ve years, beginning with the 
enunciation of clear goals in the 2006-2010 fi ve year plan, the elevation 
of the environmental function to ministerial status and the creation of 
a national energy agency. With the 11th fi ve year plan came new data 
reporting requirements, and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) were 
tasked with collecting and analyzing the data.
The energy intensity performance requirements were strengthened 
signifi cantly in early 2007 when President Hu Jintao publicly made 
energy effi ciency one of the government’s highest priorities and China’s 
State Council directed industries and provinces to report energy use 
data semi-annually. This is an uncommonly high level of reporting, and 
it enables the central government to track performance closely. This 
2007 policy shift also created a new standard of accountability; China 
made the energy effi ciency targets a “political goal,” which means that 
individual offi cials’ performance is evaluated and promotions are made 
in part on successful progress toward achieving targets. 
Energy data is relatively easy to track, as China has a limited number 
of import points for oil and natural gas and production areas for coal. 
Confi dence in this data will be strengthened over time due to a number 
of simultaneous actions: 
1. The Chinese government is engaged in a major effort to improve 
both the quality and transparency of its data collection effort. Key 
moves include: criminal sanctions for government offi cials who 
misreport data; and the issuing of major economic indicators at 
newly established monthly National Bureau of Statistics press 
conferences, where journalists will be able to ask questions about 
these indicators.3
2. The Chinese government collects data from both industries and 
provinces, so the data can be cross-checked. 
3. In addition to supply and usage data, the Chinese government 
also collects shipment and customs data. Almost all fuel travels by 
either ship or train, and thus can be monitored on the state-run rail 
system or when it arrives at an international seaport.
4. Smaller coal mines and power plants are being shut down: the gov-
ernment has been actively closing smaller mines for safety reasons 
and, as discussed below, smaller power plants and heavy industrial 
facilities to increase energy effi ciency and pollution abatement.4
5. Renewable energy is generally attached to the national electric 
grid, and power generation companies have incentives to build and 
report facilities. 
Thus, energy policy enforcement is relatively straightforward even in 
comparison to other environmental areas where multiple parameters 
need to be monitored and controlled. Moreover, unlike air quality, food 
safety or other regulations where local businesses save money by evad-
ing enforcement, NDRC’s energy effi ciency interests are aligned with 
those of the major fi rms – saving energy saves money even if it requires 
some fi rms to make institutional changes. Finally, the impacts of energy 
savings and GHG reductions are cumulative and occur regardless of the 
distribution of the reductions – if most of China’s savings are among large 
companies rather than among smaller fi rms in the near to medium term, 
the program can still succeed as a whole. This contrasts with pollution 
and health risks, where the smallest players are both the most diffi cult 
to control and can cause the greatest harm. In energy effi ciency, large 
players contribute more to the solution.
Notes
 1. For a description of how the Chinese public health system has 
developed over the past 5 years, please see Longde Wang, et al, 
“Emergence and control of infectious diseases in China,” The 
Lancet, Volume 372, Issue 9649, Pages 1598 - 1605, 1 November 
2008: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(08)61365-3/abstract
 2. See Gordon Fairclough, “UN Criticizes China on Food Safety, 
Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2008: http://online.wsj.com/ar-
ticle/SB122470185058359197.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
 3. Andrew Batson, “China’s Stats Bureau Boosts Transparency,” 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2009/08/10/chinas-stats-bureau-
boosts-transparency/, August 10, 2009.
 4. See WRI, Tsinghua “Discussion Paper: Mitigation Actions in 
China: Measurement, Reporting and Verifi cation,” May 2008, for 
the schedule of closures issued by the National Development and 
Reform Commission.
 Will China Be Able to Enforce Its Goals?Box 2
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One sign of China’s growing seriousness in implementing climate change 
policy is the 2007 formation of a high-level body led by Premier Wen 
Jiabao to formulate climate policy and coordinate implementation.1 This 
group replaced one led by the Chairman of the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC). In addition to Premier Wen, it has 
two Vice Chairs at the level of State Council (China’s governing body), 
and 20 ministerial members. In China, inter-ministerial coordination 
is only effective when it is centered in the State Council. Ministries 
typically do not coordinate well if they are expected to report directly 
to other ministries. This is especially true for environmental and social 
issues, where priority is being substantially elevated and local offi cials 
need to learn new approaches. For example, effective management of 
HIV/AIDS programs and an infusion of funds took place when the State 
Council Working Group was created in 2004.2 
At the same time the NDRC set up a climate change department to 
support both domestic climate change policy and its participation in 
international relations and greatly increased its staffi ng above the level 
of the previous offi ce.3
The members of the National Climate Change Leading Group:4
Chairman:  Premier Wen Jiabao
Vice Chairman: Principal Vice Premier Li Keqiang
 State Counselor Dai Binguo
Members: Deputy Secretary-General of the State 
Council You Quan
 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
 National Development and Reform Commission 
Chairman Zhang Ping
 Minister of Science and Technology Wan Gang
 Minister of Information Industry Li Yizhong
 Finance Minister Xie Xuren
 Minister of Land and Resources Xu Shaoshi
 Minister of Environmental Protection Zhou 
Shengxian
Members (cont) Minister of Housing and Urban and Rural 
Construction Jiang Weixin
 Minister of Transport Li Shenglin
 Minister of Water Resources Chen Lei
 Minister of Agriculture Sun Zhengcai
 Minister of Commerce Chen Deming
 Minister of Health Chen Zhu
 National Bureau of Statistics Administrator Xie 
Fuzhan
 State Forestry Administrator Jia Zhibang
 President, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Bai Chunli
 China Meteorological Administrator Zheng 
Guoguang
 National Energy Administrator Zhang Guobao
 China Civil Aviation Administrator Li Jiaxian
 State Oceanic Administrator Sun Zhihui
 NDRC Vice Chairman Xie Zhenhua
Notes
1.  Joanna I. Lewis, “China’s Strategic Priorities in International 
Climate, Negotiations,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 07/08, 
pp. 158-159.
2.  Fujie Zhang, et al, “Initiation of the National Free Antiretroviral 
Program in Rural China,” in Kaufman at al, eds., AIDS and Social 
Policy in China, Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 100. http://
www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/publications/pdfs/ AIDS%20volume 
%20complete.pdf
3.  China’s White Paper on Climate Change, “Policies and Actions for 
Addressing Climate Change,” http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/
CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf, sites the importance of this group 
on p. 51.
 4. The members of the group are listed on the Climate Change 
Department’s website: http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/cn/Column.
asp?NewsId=5474
China’s Climate Change Leading GroupBox 3
1. Improving Industrial Effi ciency
NDRC’s “Top 1,000 Enterprises Program” is central to its ef-
forts to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent.18 Established 
in its current form in 2006, this program imposes a signifi cant 
portion of the overall 20 percent energy intensity target directly 
on China’s 1,000 largest state-owned enterprises, most of which 
are in heavy industry (see Figure 4). In 2005 the enterprises in 
the program accounted for at least 33 percent of total primary 
energy demand and 47 percent of industrial energy demand. 
The program met its goals in the fi rst year, achieving the full 
20 percent of its fi ve-year target and actually exceeded its tar-
gets in 2007.19 A team from the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) in the United States analyzed the program, 
fi nding that its effectiveness has been based on implementa-
tion of targeted effi ciency measures in these fi rms. Specifi c 
targets were set for the individual companies, which are then 
required to develop energy effi ciency action plans outlining 
how they will meet the targets.20Two keys to success were the 
deployment of a national government monitoring system and 
fi rm-level requirements to create “energy manager” posi-
tions in regulated companies. The LBNL team calculated 
that the program’s fi ve year target of 100 million metric tons 
coal equivalent (MTCE) is equal to about 250 million metric 
tons of CO2.
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While systematically improving effi ciency of the largest energy 
users, the government is also implementing large-scale closures 
of ineffi cient facilities. The number of closures has been signifi -
cant: in 2007 China closed 1000 cement plants with a total of 
50 million tons capacity, 14.4 GW worth of small power plants, 
and plants producing 35 metric tons of steel production.21 Plant 
closures reduce energy consumption and send a strong signal 
to other plants to improve effi ciency.
This approach, combined with a variety of more industry-
specifi c regulations, is paying off. China’s Energy Research 
Institute reports that energy use per unit output dropped by 
7.1 percent in 2006 and 1.3 percent in 2007 for steel, by 7.3 
percent in the cement industry, 4.7 percent in papermaking 
and 11.5 percent in the coal industry in 2007.22 These results 
are essential to China’s progress in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Industrial energy use constitutes a much greater 
percentage of China’s total energy use than most countries, 
both developed and developing.
Power Sector Improvements
Over 50 percent of all China’s coal is used in the electric power 
industry. This electricity powers mainly industry but also 
households and the service sector. (See Figure 5). Improving 
energy effi ciency and reducing carbon intensity in the power 
sector have been major goals for the Chinese government. 
Last year the NDRC adopted a standard requiring all new 
coal-fi red power plants to be state-of-the-art commercially 
available or better technology. As a result, today most of the 
world’s most effi cient coal-fi red power plants are being built 
in China (See Figures 6 and 7).23 This trend contrasts with the 
United States, where new coal-fi red power plants built in the 
1980s and 1990s were actually less effi cient than those built in 
the 1970s.24 While China is still increasing its overall electric-
ity output at a rapid rate - slightly more than one power plant 
per week - new power plants both add to capacity and replace 
less effi cient, smaller power plants and direct (and very dirty) 
coal-burning at industrial sites.25  By 2011, China plans to close 
all plants of below 50 MW of capacity, and old plants below 
100 MW. Between 2011 and 2020, many plants between 100 
and 200 MW will also be closed. As a result, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that by 2011, 80 percent of 
China’s coal-fi red power plants will be modern plants above 
300 MW in capacity and this number will rise above 90 percent 
by 2020.26 Moreover, coal power is growing much more slowly 
than in earlier years. Investment in new coal-fi red power plants 
was down 22 percent in 2008 as compared with 2007.27
1000 Enterprises’ Energy 
Consumption by Sector, 2006
Figure 4
Source: NDRC and NBS, 2007.
Chinese Coal Use by Sector, 2006Figure 5
Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Statistics, 2008.
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2. Other Key Effi ciency Programs and Efforts
Beyond industrial energy effi ciency, China’s policies aim to 
increase effi ciency in sectors that are relatively modest energy 
users today but will inevitably grow as China develops. As 
noted, China’s current energy use is skewed toward industry. 
However the Chinese, half of whom still have little or no winter 
heating and most of whom have limited access to motorized 
transportation, will increase consumption levels of home heat-
ing, cooling and electricity as well as more transport-related 
energy as they become more affl uent. Much of the effort to 
combat this increase is contained in a set of policies the NDRC 
calls the “10 Key Energy Conservation Priority Programs.” 
Combined with the industrial programs, NDRC estimates 
that this initiative will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
550 million metric tons of CO2.
28 (China’s total effi ciency 
gains will actually be greater, because NDRC’s estimate does 
not include any transportation programs). These additional 
programs include:
• Local planning. China’s 2007 Energy Conservation Law 
requires all local governments to submit plans for in-
New Supercritical and Ultra-Supercritical Coal-Fired Power Plants Installed Annually, 
by Capacity
Figure 6
Source: Nalbandian, Hermine. 2008. “Performance and Risks of Advanced Pulverised Coal Plant;” IEA Clean Coal Center.
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creased urban energy effi ciency, including buildings and 
public transportation, to the central government.
• New building effi ciency regulations. China’s cur-
rent fi ve year plan mandates a 50 percent reduction in 
new buildings’ total operational energy load, and up to 
65 percent for buildings in four major municipalities: 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. According to 
recent government statistics, 97 percent of new buildings 
in urban areas meet energy saving standards at the design 
stage and 71 percent at the construction stage, up from 
17 percent and 1 percent in 2006, respectively.29 Im-
provements in the housing sector also include an aggres-
sive energy effi cient lighting program, with a goal of 150 
million more compact fl uorescent bulbs to be installed by 
2010. New subsidies that reduce the cost to consumers by 
as much as 50 percent30 have made these lamps common-
place within a few years.
• Fuel effi ciency standards. Not only does China already 
have higher fuel economy standards than the United 
States, Canada and Australia at 36.7 mpg for urban 
vehicles, but in 2007 it also established an average fuel 
economy standard of 34 mpg for both on and off road ru-
ral vehicles.31 While vehicle use in China is growing, it is 
important to note that in China today there is one vehicle 
for every 70 people, as opposed to one for every single 
person in the United States.32
• Rapid transit and investments in public transport, 
including six effi ciency upgrades to China’s intercity rail 
system in the past 10 years. The latest effi ciency upgrade 
covered 9 major routes in 17 provinces and increased 
railway shipping capacity by 18 percent when the new 
schedule was launched in June 2007.33 According to of-
fi cials from the Ministry of Railways, 6003 km of track 
from 18 main lines have been approved for high-speed 
operation. For example, by 2013 travel time from Beijing 
to Shanghai will drop from 13 to 5 hours. In addition, 
public transportation in at least 15 major cities is being 
signifi cantly improved.34 For example, in preparation for 
the Olympics, Beijing added three new subway lines, 
light rail connecting downtown and the airport and bus 
rapid transit.
Policy Goal #2: 15 Percent Renewable Energy by 2020
In addition to pursuing the world’s most effi cient coal technolo-
gies, China’s National Climate Change Program also expects to 
avert 640 million metric tons of CO2 through the use of non-
fossil fuels including hydropower, nuclear and an ambitious 
scale up of renewable energy.35
While China has developed modern dams only since the 1980s, 
hydropower is responsible for the biggest share of projected 
emissions savings through 2010, estimated at 500 million 
metric tons of CO2.
36
The most dramatic changes in China’s energy mix in the last 
several years have been in new renewable energy sources. 
China is in the process of raising its wind generation capac-
ity goal to as much as 150 GW by 2020.37 a fi ve-fold increase 
from the original target of 30 GW by 2020, set in 2005, and 
more than fi ve times current U.S. wind capacity (see Figure 
8). China has raised its target after consistently outpacing early 
goals - meeting its 2010 goal of 5 GW in 2007, and on track to 
reach at least double that original goal by 2010. Investment 
in wind power in 2008 was 72 percent higher than in 2007.38
China’s solar industry is also growing rapidly. China produced 
nearly 40 percent of the global supply of solar photovoltaics 
in 2008, up from less than 20 percent in 2006, most of which 
were exported to other markets.39  However, with continuing 
decreases in solar technology costs, domestic use should start to 
grow. China already accounts for 70 percent of global produc-
tion and use of solar hot water heating systems. Ten percent 
of Chinese homes have solar water heaters installed and the 
number is growing at 20 percent per year.40 These heaters save 
Chinese Wind TargetsFigure 8
Source: Global Wind Energy Council, Global Installed Wind Power 
Capacity (MW) – Regional Distribution, 2009.
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the equivalent of 20 million metric tons of coal annually, or 
approximately 45 million metric tons of CO2, while solar PV 
and wind power are expected to avert 60 million metric tons 
of CO2 by 2010.
41 From the outset, the Chinese wind program 
focused on the domestic market, but 2009 marks a real turn-
around for the solar power market, previously focused on 
exports. In March 2009, the Chinese government announced 
a subsidy of RMB 20 (about US$2.92 at that time) per watt 
for solar PV installations, putting its subsidy at slightly above 
the current German rate.42
Alternative energy sources such as organic and municipal waste 
and methane gas captured from coal beds and mines are also 
playing increasingly important roles in energy production in both 
the public and private sectors. In 2007, the national government 
added a 0.25 Yuan feed-in tariff43 to encourage biomass use in 
power production with a goal of reaching 30 GW of biomass-
to-power by 2030. This is in addition to industrial biomass use, 
with already boasts 1600 plants in operation nationwide, and 
over 50 cities running waste-to-energy plants. China’s national 
goal is to process 30 percent of total municipal waste into energy 
by 2030.44 The national plan estimates savings of 30 million 
metric tons of CO2.
SECTION 2
Does China need a cap-and-trade program in order 
to begin reducing emissions?
Market-based mechanisms to promote GHG emission re-
duction include both taxes and cap-and-trade systems and 
can promote cost savings by allowing the potential polluter 
to choose the least-cost approach to reducing the pollution. 
These are generally designed as an alternative to regulatory 
command-and-control approaches that require “best available 
control technology” or specifi c technology standards. 
In the United States cap-and-trade programs have been de-
signed in the context of the well-developed fi nancial system 
and its capacity for handling new fi nancial instruments with 
ease. The sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade system, which became 
part of U.S. environmental regulation in 1990, was devel-
oped to provide a non-tax, market-based pollution reduction 
mechanism. 
In China, however, the current capacity in fi nancial markets 
and the central regulatory systems is vastly different than in the 
United States, and, by implication, so are the climate mitigation 
policies available to Chinese policymakers. The state of China’s 
industries, markets and environmental regulatory agencies 
indicate that targets and quotas, green taxes and incentives 
— all tools being used effectively by Beijing today — may be 
both appropriate and effi cient mechanisms for GHG emission 
abatement in China. 
This type of pluralistic approach is actually envisioned in the 
Bali Action Plan agreed to in 2007 as the roadmap for a new 
agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention 
for Climate Change, due to be concluded in Copenhagen in 
Decmeber 2009. The plan introduced the concept of “measur-
able, reportable and verifi able” policies, measures and support. 
Many of the policies that China uses might be considered under 
this type of framework.45 
For example: 
• Targets and quotas: As described previously, China has 
implemented a wide variety of environmental and energy 
targets and quotas. This reliance on targets to achieve 
and measure outcomes is seen in all sectors of Chinese 
policy. Whether mandating the number of senior centers 
to be built, university seats to be added or rail lines to be 
laid, the central government uses targets and quotas to 
ensure that local and regional offi cials are held account-
able to central policies. The resulting familiarity with 
simple quantitative policy mechanisms has made the 
implementation of energy effi ciency targets easier than 
would have otherwise been possible. 
• Taxes: Several of China’s tax structures, including its 
vehicle and value added taxes, have been designed with 
energy and environmental outcomes in mind. Although 
China does not have the necessary emissions tracking 
mechanisms and infrastructure in place to administer 
an emissions tax or cap, these taxes have proven the 
government’s ability to track consumption and industrial 
output. This suggests that straightforward taxes on energy 
sources may be more appropriate initially than a cap on 
GHG emissions. Since such taxes can be administered 
directly to a limited number of energy companies, China 
can take advantage of existing institutions to enforce its 
policies. Proving its willingness to encourage changes in 
energy consumption through taxes, China increased fuel 
taxes on gasoline and diesel on January 1, 2009.46
• Financial incentives and penalties: China has had a 
long history of using fi nancial carrots and sticks to en-
courage desired outcomes. Due to centralized control of 
the banking sector, the government has a unique ability 
to encourage climate-conscious investment practices 
through a combination of favorable and punitive lending 
policies. For example, China invested US$12 billion in 
renewable energy capacity (excluding large hydropower) 
in 2007, second only to Germany.47 Conversely, China’s 
11O c t o b e r  2 0 0 9 W O R L D  R E S O U R C E S  I N S T I T U T E
ISSUE BRIEF: China, the United States, and the Climate Change Challenge
new green credit policy punishes heavy polluters by limit-
ing bank lending to companies with heavy pollution and 
high energy consumption. Since July 2008, 12 such com-
panies have been banned from obtaining loans. In Jiangsu 
province alone, more than US$137 million in loans have 
been called in from companies that failed environmen-
tal assessments by the local Environmental Protection 
Bureau.48 
In addition, there are technical and market capacity limitations 
in China that could hinder reliance on a cap-and-trade system 
in the near term. 
• Technical capacity: A cap-and-trade system depends 
on sophisticated monitoring and verifi cation programs 
that China simply does not have in place today. Even at 
the most general level of reporting, Chinese GHG data 
is inadequate. Whereas the United States prepares an-
nual GHG inventories to quantify domestic emissions 
and China reports quarterly energy use, China has only 
submitted a single national inventory of its greenhouse 
gas emissions to the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change.49 WRI and other organizations are working 
in China today to build local capacity for undertaking 
rigorous GHG accounting programs.50 Chinese industry 
and government partnerships are now designing emis-
sions calculators and registry programs. Establishing 
these programs and building the capacity to verify the 
data will take several years. For example, China has spent 
the past fi fteen years developing its sulfur dioxide emis-
sions monitoring and compliance system, and in recent 
years conducting experimental sulfur trades. After years 
of development and some diffi cult growing pains, there 
is a push among environmental policy advisors for the 
Chinese government to establish a national sulfur dioxide 
cap-and-trade program in the power sector, starting in 
2011.51
• Market maturity: China’s fi nancial markets are not as 
mature as U.S. and European markets, given their short 
history and limited scope. Cap-and-trade makes sense 
when underlying market structures already exist. Ameri-
can exchanges will provide a reliable environment for 
trading allowances, offsets and fi nancial derivatives to 
hedge compliance and energy costs. In comparison, Chi-
na’s markets may not have the necessary liquidity or ma-
turity to allow companies to benefi t from the effi ciencies 
of cap-and-trade regulation. China’s stock markets are 
small and a sideline to the real economy. China’s futures 
market is even more immature. As a result, traders in a 
new derivative, such as an emissions credit, would not 
necessarily have the sophistication to identify real from 
false claims, and the immaturity of the monitoring system 
suggests there would be many unreliable reports. Finally, 
in a country with a sophisticated fi nancial system there 
are real cost savings in relying on it in part to absorb the 
enforcement costs. Given that China’s tax and industrial 
oversight structures are more developed, the cost savings 
are likely to be realized by using these structures rather 
than fi nancial structures.
There is no question that China needs more accurate entity 
and national level emissions accounting. However, as Section 
1 illustrates, the government has demonstrated that it can ac-
complish a considerable amount of carbon mitigation even as it 
develops better accounting. Until that accounting is developed, 
and until its fi nancial markets further develop, China is not in 
a position to implement an effective national cap-and-trade 
system. However, it is experimenting with limited local or 
single sector cap-and-trade programs, which can inform future 
climate policy options, similar to the experiments in sulfur 
trading in the past ten years.52
SECTION THREE
Will Climate Legislation in the United States Result 
in the Transfer of Carbon-Intensive Jobs to China?
International climate negotiations begun in 1992 under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) emphasized that countries have “common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility” to mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Until recently, this had been interpreted as focused on 
timing rather than on differential approaches. In other words, 
the obligations (emission reduction levels and target dates) 
of different countries would be staggered based on their 
development levels and historic and current contributions 
to global emissions. This interpretation resulted in concern 
voiced by the U.S. Congress that if emerging countries that 
were also major greenhouse gas emitters were not required 
to take simultaneous action, would that place undue burdens 
on the United States?
The “Bali Action Plan” agreed to by the international com-
munity in 2007 as the pathway to a new UNFCCC treaty at 
Copenhagen offered a signifi cant step forward from the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, which it would replace. The essence is to 
establish “nationally appropriate” measures and actions that 
can be measured, reported and verifi ed.53 As the United States, 
China and other countries worldwide develop such appropriate 
national approaches to mitigation, the policies they adopt will 
vary in form and stringency. As a result, the costs they impose 
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on manufacturers are unlikely to be uniform. American manu-
facturers fear that the imbalances created by aggressive climate 
policy in the United States could contribute signifi cantly to the 
“offshore-ing” of jobs and relocation of industry to countries 
with lower standards and production costs.
For most U.S. industries, these fears are overstated and limited 
to industries where energy and fossil fuels are a large portion 
of their cost structures and where those industries participate 
in global markets.54 In industries such as transportation equip-
ment and electronics manufacturing, energy accounts for less 
than one percent of total production costs (See Figure 9). In 
fact, industries are more likely to be impacted by fl uctuations 
in currency exchange rates or national differences in tax and 
transportation costs. Carbon regulation compliance costs are 
likely to be insignifi cant to global competitiveness of these 
industries. 
For other sectors, including pulp and paper, chemicals, non-
metallic mineral products, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
energy costs can reach 20 percent of total production costs. 
Initial observations in Europe and preliminary modeling of 
American policies indicate that, in the absence of mechanisms 
to address relative differences in compliance costs, these sec-
tors could potentially face pressure to relocate to nations with 
less stringent climate change policies.55
Since these exposed industries are a discrete portion of the 
economy, U.S. and European policymakers have reviewed 
several options to negate potential competitiveness impacts. 
These policies can be grouped into three categories:
1. Cost containment mechanisms aim to reduce the pres-
sure on carbon dioxide-intensive industries by limiting 
the cost of complying with climate legislation. The most 
direct methods proposed have sought to use allowance 
allocations to reimburse exposed sectors for the costs of 
complying with the legislation. Although such policies 
could shield industries from newfound competitiveness 
concerns, they must be carefully structured to maintain 
incentives for emissions mitigation and avoid overcom-
pensating fi rms.
2. Trade measures do not limit costs on the covered compa-
nies but seek to indirectly apply similar costs to compet-
ing companies in other countries through the treatment 
of traded goods at the border. Although this policy mech-
anism found widespread support in legislation during the 
110th Congress, signifi cant fl aws have been overlooked.56 
U.S. Energy Intensity by IndustryFigure 9
Source: Houser, Heilmayr, Werksman, work under way.
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For example, border price adjustments of imports would 
negatively impact downstream manufacturers such as the 
automobile industry by increasing costs of raw materials. 
Furthermore, these policies would do little to protect 
important export markets, since adjustments would only 
apply to the U.S. market. Finally, the confrontational 
approach represented by trade measures may damage im-
portant international negotiations to create a multilateral 
agreement to address climate change by destroying trust 
and driving developing countries away from the table.57 
3. Coordinated international actions seek to reduce the 
pressure on carbon-intensive industries by encourag-
ing major trading partners to impose similar costs or 
policies. Commonly cited international mechanisms to 
address competitiveness and leakage concerns include 
sectoral agreements and the successful negotiation of 
a global climate agreement under the UNFCCC that 
would include mandatory action by developing countries. 
Although China’s offi cial negotiating position in climate 
debates has focused on ensuring that developed countries 
make reduction commitments, China’s support for the 
Bali Action Plan, and its National Climate Change plat-
form foreshadow possible willingness on China’s part to 
make commitments to regulate specifi c, heavily polluting 
industries. Nevertheless, perfect coordination of national 
actions is unlikely in the immediate future, so the United 
States is likely to again consider the fi rst two approaches 
as China phases in its emissions requirements. 
Careful application of cost containment mechanisms should 
enable the domestic policy process to advance in parallel 
to international negotiations. This combination of domestic 
mechanisms and international coordination will allow the 
United States to pursue aggressive mitigation targets without 
adversely affecting equitable international trade or domestic 
employment and industry.
SECTION FOUR
How can comprehensive climate change legislation in 
the United States spur further action in China? 
During the debate over climate change legislation in Congress, 
U.S. policymakers pondered what level of GHG reduction 
commitment was appropriate for the United States under 
cap-and-trade legislation. The congressional debate included 
concerns over the current uncertainty surrounding China’s 
GHG mitigation actions, willingness to compile, monitor and 
verify data and governance capacity. However, action by the 
United States is a pre-condition to creating an incentive for 
China to commit more deeply to international efforts to reduce 
global emissions.58 U.S. policy can help precipitate Chinese 
action in a number of ways:
1. Drive important technological changes that will be need-
ed for China to make its own reductions. As the world’s 
wealthiest nation, the United States is uniquely posi-
tioned to spur research, development and capital invest-
ment in low-carbon technologies, such as carbon capture 
and storage, wind and solar energy, and newer vehicle 
technologies. By setting strong domestic emission limits, 
the United States would unleash new creativity and drive 
down prices for new technologies including renewables, 
highly effi cient long-distance transmission lines and plug-
in vehicles. 
2. Directly engage with China in promoting ambitious new 
developments to address China’s greatest challenge – 
how to address CO2 emissions from coal. This could be 
achieved by conducting joint research in areas ranging 
from generation and transmission effi ciency to carbon, 
capture and storage, and helping build China’s regulatory 
and implementation capacity. As the major developed 
country that faces a similar challenge, the United States 
is uniquely positioned to play this role.
3. Passage of comprehensive U.S. climate policy. This will 
motivate those in China who worry about China’s global 
reputation and its ability to achieve technology leader-
ship, as well as encourage the reformist voices in China 
that are already arguing for increased domestic action 
and international commitments. 
Because the United States failed to ratify and implement 
the Kyoto Protocol, many in China doubt it is prepared to 
transform its economy to seriously address climate change. 
Decisive U.S. leadership and the enactment of climate policy 
should convince China and the rest of the world that the U.S. 
is prepared for action and that others have the opportunity to 
join. Many business and government leaders in both China 
and the United States agree that those who move decisively 
on climate policy will be the technology leaders in the new 
low-carbon economy.
SECTION FIVE 
How can the United States and China work collab-
oratively on climate change action? 
Together, China and the United States are responsible for 
nearly 40 percent of total global emissions (See Figure 10). As a 
result, it will be crucial for these two countries to cooperate in 
developing pathways to a low-carbon economy. The structures 
for collaboration already exist in both the public and private 
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sectors. For example, most Chinese climate change experts cite 
the critical importance of assistance from the United States’ 
Department of Energy (DOE) when China was conducting its 
fi rst National Assessment on climate change in the late 1990s.59 
Since then, a number of the DOE National Laboratories have 
assisted China in areas ranging from energy effi ciency to clean 
coal, but funding has been highly variable. Similarly, U.S. 
and international companies have stepped up joint research 
and development programs with Chinese partners, both on 
technology applications and in some cases on specifi c policies, 
such as sustainable mobility. These programs have played a 
role and can continue to do so, but would benefi t from strong 
and consistent national U.S. policy focused on clear goals both 
for U.S. policy development and for how to contribute to the 
transformation of China.
The challenge for the future is to create a coherent climate 
partnership program while ensuring that all key government 
agencies, academics, NGOs and the private sectors in both 
countries are able to contribute effectively. Most vital will be 
setting clear goals for the relationship. These goals should in-
clude metrics for energy use or carbon dioxide emissions (and 
could refl ect the differences between the countries), but they 
should also set clear targets for how the two countries want to 
collaborate, from developing better measuring and regulatory 
structures to developing clean, advanced coal technology.60
For the United States, four key agencies have representation 
in Beijing (see Table 1). Three opened Beijing offi ces within 
the last four years. A number of other key organizations do not 
have Beijing representation, but have ongoing relationships, 
many now extending back 30 years. The Chinese situation is 
similar. Three key ministries are represented at the Chinese 
Embassy in Washington, while others engage on a less perma-
nent basis. While roles of U.S. agencies in relation to climate 
change have traditionally been poorly defi ned and their mis-
sions have changed from year to year, clarifi cations on both 
roles would yield improved collaborations. 
In neither the United States nor China are these lists ex-
haustive. Government agencies covering agriculture, fi sh-
eries, forestry, wildlife, disaster management and others all 
increasingly play roles in both domestic deliberations and 
international cooperation. Both countries support rich aca-
demic research, and in China a number of academics serve 
on its international negotiating team. The private sector is 
also vital. As China has moved forward with climate programs 
in the past two to three years, the private sector has shown 
markedly more interest in being engaged, not only in discus-
sions, but actual projects. Both the oil and gas and power 
industries have renewable energy and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) programs. All industries are directly involved 
in effi ciency.
Aggregate GHG Emissions  by Country, 2005Figure 10
Source: WRI, CAIT. Percent contributions are for year 2005 GHG emissions only. Moving from left to right, countries are added in order of 
their absolute emissions, with the largest being added fi rst. Figures exclude emissions from land-use change and forestry and bunker fuels. 
Adapted from Figure 2.3 in Baumert et al. (2005)
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Enhanced Bilateral Cooperation
In July 2009, the United States and China signed a “Memoran-
dum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate 
Change, Energy and the Environment.” This new agreement 
provides for a bilateral working group to coordinate efforts 
under two existing structures: The Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) and the Ten Year Energy and Environment 
Framework. 
The S&ED provides an overarching coordinated approach 
to the bilateral relationship, and addresses environment as a 
subset. It is headed at the Vice Premier level in China and is 
now headed in the United States by the secretaries of State 
and Treasury, with the Secretary of State responsible for en-
ergy, environment and climate change. With ministerial-level 
meetings twice a year and active working groups, the S&ED 
has become the major venue for bilateral economic and energy 
discussions over the last two years. The Energy and Environ-
ment Framework creates a structure for this collaboration, but 
to date the two countries have not established shared goals. The 
MOU states that Washington and Beijing will implement and 
expand the ten year framework. Were the framework restruc-
tured to focus on the climate change and green job priorities 
of the new U.S. administration, this structure could play a key 
role in creating bilateral programs that support both domestic 
GHG control efforts and the international negotiations.
Using existing structures is an effective approach, because 
both governments already have organizational structures to 
support them. Thus, the two governments should now be 
able to move forward on goal- and policy-setting and project 
development. At the same time, there is a need to ensure that 
suffi cient resources are mobilized and that these bilateral 
efforts are focused directly on achieving specifi c energy and 
environmental policy objectives.
In addition to the S&ED and the ten year framework, there is 
also a need to ensure that science and broader environmental 
cooperation are integrated into climate change cooperation. 
These areas of joint interest are coordinated through:
• The U.S.-China Science and Technology (S&T) 
Cooperation Agreement. The Joint Commission on 
Science and Technology (JCST) meets at the ministerial 
level (White House Science Advisor) every two years and 
at the Executive Secretary (offi ce director) level in the 
alternating years. All major agencies doing technical work 
do so under this agreement, including DOE, EPA, NSF, 
and NOAA. The Commission offers a venue for research-
oriented collaboration. Its working groups have not been 
developed as much as in other United States-China 
commissions, but those under the Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade and under the Strategic Economic 
Dialogue provide models. This group provides the best 
venue for deepening climate science cooperation. 
• Joint Commission on Environmental Cooperation 
(JCEC). This acts as the annual ministerial-level coordi-
nating body for the United States EPA and the Chinese 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in relation 
to their 2003 MOU on Environmental Cooperation. The 
MOU is also theoretically part of the S&T Agreement but 
operates somewhat autonomously, and the two agencies 
took their own initiative in setting up this Commission. 
EPA and MEP have separate annexes on air, water and 
Key U.S. agencies Key Chinese agencies
With Beijing representation With Chinese ties
With Washington DC 
representation
Without direct U.S. 
representation
Department of State Environmental Protection Agency Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Environmental 
Protection
Department of Energy National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration
National Development and 
Reform Commission
Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology 
National Science Foundation National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology
State Meteorological 
Administration 
U.S. Agency for International 
Development
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences
Key Agencies for United States-China CollaborationTable 1
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toxics. On air, they have worked together very closely 
on continuous emissions monitoring and air pollution 
regulation, and there is a very sound basis for enhancing 
this collaboration. This single department discussion is 
generally held in tandem with the S&ED and is a more 
technical complement to the ten year framework.
These bilateral institutions operate in tandem with multilateral 
processes. China and the United States are both members of 
a number of organizations or treaties which have addressed 
climate change, including:
• The UNFCCC, the central framework for international 
climate negotiations and multilateral agreement. 
• The Asia Pacifi c Partnership for Clean Energy and Cli-
mate (APP), which has many active public-private partner-
ship projects in key sectors. The APP was the fi rst signifi -
cant example of Chinese private sector involvement in an 
international partnership process. The partnership has 
been effective in running cooperative projects and sharing 
best practices. However, its impact to date has been lim-
ited by a lack of clear goals or fully shared views on how 
programs should be managed and funded. The United 
States and China would benefi t from strengthening these 
programs and building them around major targets.
• The Major Economies Forum, a relatively new process 
initiated under President Bush, recognized the need to 
expand beyond traditional processes like the UN and 
the G8 both to ensure consultation among a core group 
and to ensure large developing countries’ involvement. 
The group still struggles with whether its major goal is to 
resolve issues for the UNFCCC or to operate in an inde-
pendent arena. The Chinese have never agreed to formal 
negotiations outside the UNFCCC process. To make 
suffi cient progress by Copenhagen, the U.S. team will 
need to seek venues for in-depth discussion with Chinese 
counterparts.
• The Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation or APEC com-
munity has also had some climate change discussions. 
These have not been as intensive as APP.
• Technology Programs such as: 
– The Methane to Markets Partnership or M2M, a glob-
al grouping focused on a single greenhouse gas. It has 
effectively used capacity-building to create successful 
large-scale methane business-promotion events. 
– The International Partnership for the Hydrogen 
Economy (IPHE), where DOE has worked with the 
Chinese on hydrogen road-mapping.
– The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. 
– The Committee on Earth Observing Satellites 
(CEOS). China has been a key player in various earth 
observation efforts, and these can be used to enhance 
satellite-based climate and emissions monitoring.
These partnerships could potentially become part of a model 
for technology cooperation under the UNFCCC. While priori-
ties have changed, and some like the IPHE look likely to be 
de-emphasized under the Obama administration, the approach 
has been effective in promoting new technologies and, in the 
case of M2M, spurring actual investments.
There are tremendous opportunities for the United States and 
China to collaborate, based on existing mechanisms such as 
those discussed above. To succeed, they will require common 
metrics of progress and agreed-upon fi nancial and techni-
cal contributions from both sides. China is already active in 
seeking more international cooperation and has budgeted for 
collaborative research, for example including an inte rnational 
cooperation fund of US$1 billion for climate change research 
in the 11th fi ve-year plan (2006-2010).61
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD
Responding to both its domestic needs and international con-
cerns, China has set goals and is taking actions to reduce its 
emissions below business as usual and the historical trajectory 
for developing countries. Chinese policy approaches have both 
similarities and differences from those taken in the United 
States and Europe. The relevant question is not whether 
such approaches and actions are identical, but whether they 
are measurable, reportable and verifi able. It will be critical 
to agree, through a global framework, on low carbon emis-
sions strategies and to ensure that we have the metrics and 
mechanisms necessary for ensuring common understanding 
and transparency.
China is pursuing international collaboration across a range 
of climate policies, including measurement and enforcement, 
modeling and planning, clean coal, energy-effi ciency and clean 
vehicles technologies. For China to “leapfrog” technologically 
to lower carbon technologies, wealthier countries will have 
to invest in, and push down the cost curves for, those new 
technologies. 
A clear program for collaboration between the United States 
and China should:
• Set clear goals and benchmarks, both in energy or carbon 
terms and in terms of programs, projects, technologies 
and policies to be developed;
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• Be tied to a specifi c funding mechanism in the United 
States;
• Involve relatively modest but long-term programs in 
areas including monitoring, regulatory infrastructure, 
policy development and start-up research support; 
• Involve focused, ambitious programs in technology devel-
opment and deployment.
The recent bilateral MOU provides a framework for such co-
operation. The challenge will be to create specifi c programs 
of work with suffi cient ambition, as well as clear targets and 
benchmarks. To succeed such a program will need to involve 
the ambitions and active engagement of both countries.
The benefi ts of such engagement will not be limited to the 
United States and China. It will set the entire world on the 
path to greatly lowered CO2 emissions. Moreover, collabora-
tive action will reduce concerns about emissions merely being 
transferred from one country to another. Collaborative tech-
nological engagement between the United States and China 
leverages the two countries’ innovative capacity, increases 
access to future markets and leads to better technology and 
more technology winners for both countries. Both the United 
States and China have an interest today in burnishing their 
image on this important issue. There is no better way to do so 
than through real and productive collaborative efforts that lead 
to solutions for the greatest challenge of our time.
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